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ver the past several years, Taylor rules
have attracted increased attention of
analysts,policymakers,andthefinancial
press. Taylor rules recommend a setting for the
level of the federal funds rate based on the state
of the economy. For instance, they may recom-
mend raising the federal funds rate when infla-
tion is above target or lowering the federal funds
rate when a recession appears to be more of a
threat.Taylorruleshavebecomemoreappealing
recently with the apparent breakdown in the
relationship between money growth and infla-
tion (Blinder). But, while Taylor rules have
attracted considerable interest, the usefulness of
rule recommendations to policymakers has not
been well established.
To be useful to policymakers, rule recommen-
dations should be robust to minor variations in
the rule specification. While most analysts and
policymakers agree on the fundamental features
of a monetary policy rule, consensus has not
been reached on the details of the specification.
The Taylor rule is a specific rule that incorpo-
rates several assumptions. Rule recommenda-
tions should be robust if these assumptions are
replaced by reasonable alternatives. For exam-
ple, rule recommendations would not be robust
if different measures of price inflation yield a
wide range of rule recommendations. If recom-
mendations differ considerably depending on
whether price inflation is measured using the
core consumer price index or the chain price
index for GDP, then the rule may not be very
useful.
Rule recommendations should also be reliable.
A reliable rule might be expected to replicate
federal funds rate settings over a period when
policymakers thought policy actions were suc-
cessful. If past policy decisions are regarded
favorably, then policymakers may want to base
current decisions on a similar strategy. To the
extentrulerecommendationsreplicatepastfavor-
able policy settings, policymakers may regard
the rule as reliable. But, even a rule that can
replicate favorable policy actions may not be
regardedasreliableifpastpolicydecisionswere
influenced by economic events beyond the scope
of the rule.
Thisarticleexamineswhetherrecommendations
from Taylor rules are useful to policymakers as
they decide how to adjust the federal funds rate.
ThearticlesuggeststhattheusefulnessofTaylor
rule recommendations to policymakers faced
with real-time policy decisions is limited. Rule
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1 Taylor rules may be use-
ful to policymakers in other ways. For example,
because they incorporate the overall characteris-
ticsofsoundmonetarypolicygenerallyagreedon
by analysts and policymakers, Taylor rules may
provide a good starting point for discussions of
issues that concern policymakers. Monetary pol-
icy rules also play an important role in most fore-
casting models.
ThefirstsectionofthearticledescribestheTay-
lor rule and discusses common generalizations of
the Taylor rule. The second section examines the
robustness of rule recommendations to small dif-
ferences in rule specifications. The third section
assesses the reliability of rule recommendations.
I. WHAT ARE TAYLOR-TYPE
RULES?
This article focuses on a class of policy rules
that model the federal funds rate target as a func-
tion of the deviation of inflation from a target rate
and the deviation of real GDP from potential real
GDP(that is, its long-run sustainable trend).
2 The
rules assume that policymakers seek to stabilize
output and prices about paths that are thought to
be optimal and that by changing the federal funds
rate target they can influence output and prices
(Cecchetti). Such rules are often called Taylor
rules because they resemble a simple rule, known
as the Taylor rule, suggested by John Taylor in
1993. This section reviews the Taylor rule and
discusses a class of similar rules that incorporate
the same basic framework for policy. In the
remainder of the article, this class of similar rules
will be referred to as Taylor-type rules to distin-
guish them from the original Taylor rule.
The Taylor rule
The Taylor rule recommends a target for the
level of the nominal federal funds rate that depends
on four factors.
3 The first factor is the current
inflation rate. The second factor is the equilib-
rium real interest rate. When added together,
these two factors provide a benchmark recom-
mendation for the nominal federal funds rate.
The third factor is an inflation gap adjustment
factor based on the gap between the inflation
rate and a given target for inflation.
4 This factor
recommendsraisingthefederalfundsrateabove
the benchmark if inflation is above the target for
inflation and lowering the federal funds rate
below the benchmark if inflation is below the
target. The fourth factor is an output gap adjust-
ment factor based on the gap between real GDP
andpotentialrealGDP.Thisfactorrecommends
raising the federal funds rate above the bench-
mark if the gap is positive (real GDP is above
potential real GDP) and lowering the federal
funds rate below the benchmark if the gap is
negative (real GDP is below potential real
GDP). These factors summarize several impor-
tant aspects of policy.
5
The sum of the first and second factors pro-
vides a benchmark recommendation for the fed-
eral funds rate that would keep inflation at its
current rate, provided the economy is operating
at its potential. Because the benchmark recom-
mendation rises one-for-one with the current
rate of inflation, the higher current inflation is,
the higher the rule recommendation will be, all
else equal. This relationship between current
inflation and the benchmark recommendation
for the nominal federal funds rate keeps the
implied real interest rate constant.
The use of the equilibrium real rate in the Taylor
rule emphasizes that real rates play a central role
in formulating monetary policy. Although the nom-
inal federal funds rate is identified as the instru-
ment that policymakers adjust, the real interest
rate is what affects real economic activity. In par-
ticular,therulesclarifythatrealinterestrateswill
beincreasedaboveequilibriumwheninflationis
above target or output is above its potential.
The third and fourth factors in the Taylor rule
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targeting a low and stable rate of inflation while
promoting maximum sustainable growth. These
adjustment factors can also be seen as incorporat-
ing both long-run and short-run goals. The infla-
tiongapadjustmentfactorincorporatesthecentral
banks long-run inflation goal. The output gap
adjustment factor incorporates the view that in
the short-run policy should lean against cyclical
winds. Weights in the adjustment factors embody
a presumed attitude toward the short-run tradeoff
between inflation and output.
Theoutputgapadjustmentfactormayrepresent
another aspect of policy. Some analysts have
argued that the output gap adjustment factor
brings a forward-looking, or preemptive, motive
to policy recommendations. According to this
view, a positive output gap signals likely future
increases in inflation. Consequently, funds rate
recommendations that reflect an output gap
adjustment may correspond to policy actions
designed to preempt an otherwise anticipated
increase in inflation.
Although the Taylor rule incorporates many
important aspects of policy, it also is based on
several assumptions. Assumptions of some form
are necessary to move from a framework for policy




funds rate(t) = GDP price inflation(t)
+ 2.0 + 0.5´(GDP price inflation(t)  2.0)
+ 0.5 ´(output gap(t)). (1)
In this expression, the benchmark recommen-
dation is the sum of GDP price inflation and the
2.0 percent equilibrium real rate. The third term
on the right side of the expression is the inflation
gap adjustment, which raises the funds rate target
by one-half of the gap between GDPprice inflation
and the 2.0 percent inflation target. The fourth
term on the right side of the expression is the out-
put gap adjustment, which raises the funds rate
target by one-half of the output gap, where the
output gap is defined as the percent deviation of
the level of real GDP from the level of potential
real GDP.
7
Assumptions are embedded in all components
of the rule. Taylor-rule recommendations in a
given quarter are based on the output gap in the
samequarterandoninflationoverthefourquar-
ters ending in the same quarter. In the Taylor
rule, monetary policy targets GDP price infla-
tion measured as the rate of inflation in the GDP
deflator over the previous four quarters. The
equilibrium real rate, represented by the second
termontherightsideoftheexpression,isassumed
to equal 2.0 percent. The inflation gap adjust-
ment incorporates a weight equal to one-half.
The policy target for inflation is assumed to
equal 2.0 percent. The output gap adjustment
incorporatesaweightequaltoone-half.And,the
output gap is constructed using a series for poten-
tial real GDP that grows 2.2 percent per year.
Taylor-type rules
Taylorpresentedhisruleasasimple,representa-
tivespecification that captured the general frame-
work for policy discussed earlier. Because there
isalackofconsensusabouttheexactspecification,
evaluating alternative similar specifications is
important when assessing the usefulness of rule
recommendations. The details of the specifica-
tions of the Taylor-type rules examined in this
article differ somewhat from the Taylor rule,
although they represent the same general frame-
work for policy. The remainder of this section
discusses specification details of the Taylor rule
and alternative reasonable assumptions about tim-
ing, weights, smoothing, and measurement that
may be made in Taylor-type rules.
In the Taylor-type rules examined in this article,
the timing of the economic variables on which
funds rate settings depend is different than in
Taylorsspecification.TheTaylorrulerecommends
setting the federal funds rate according to the
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gap over the previous four quarters. However,
this specification inappropriately assumes that
the central bank knows the current quarter values
of real GDP and a price index when setting the
federal funds rate for that quarter (McCallum
1998a,b; Orphanides; McCallum and Nelson). In
the United States, the first (or advance) release of
real GDP data for each quarter is not available
until roughly a month after the end of that quarter.
The second (or preliminary) release is not avail-
ableuntilroughlytwomonthsaftertheendofthat
quarter. And, the third (or final) release is not
available until roughly three months after the end
of that quarter. In addition, historical data may be
revised with the annual revisions of the National
Income and Product Accounts data, or with the
less frequent comprehensive revisions.
8
To partially address the timing problem, this
article assumes that the federal funds rate in a
given quarter is set according to the output gap
and the inflation gap in the previous quarter.




because this article uses the version of historical
data available at the start of 1999, even rule rec-
ommendations based on lagged data will likely
differ from those based on real-time data, that is,
the version of the data actually available during
the quarter of the policy decision (McNees;
Orphanides; Ghysels, Swanson, and Callan).
The second potential difference between
Taylor-type rules and the Taylor rule is in the
weights embedded in the inflation and output
gap adjustments. The weights represent the re-
sponsiveness of monetary policy to deviations of
inflation from the inflation target and deviations
of output from potential output. In the Taylor
rule,theoutput and inflation gaps are each multi-
pliedbyaweightof0.5,butTaylornotedalackof
consensus about the size of the weights in policy
rules. This article explores rule recommendations
with weights of 0.5, but also estimates Taylor-
type rules to see if alternative weights are more
consistent with historical policy.
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The third potential difference is that Taylor-
type rules may account for smoothing behavior
on the part of the Federal Reserve. Many ana-
lysts have noted that the Federal Reserve has a
tendencytosmoothmovementsofthefundsrate
(Goodfriend;Orphanides;Clarida,Gali,andGertler
1998). Concern about the stability of financial
marketsmayleadtheFederalReservetosmooth
funds rate changes (McNees).
11 Smoothing may
also indicate responsiveness of policy actions to
inflation and output gaps observed over several
quarters rather than just a single quarter. Alter-
natively, smoothing may be justified when the
economic impact of changes in the funds rate is
uncertain (Sack). Smoothing can be incorpo-
rated in a Taylor-type rule by assuming that the
Federal Reserve puts some weight on the previous
level of the funds rate in addition to the inflation
and output gaps when deciding on the current
level of the federal funds rate. By contrast, the
Taylor rule provides recommendations for fed-
eral funds rate settings which depend on the out-
put gap and inflation gap but not on the previous
level of the federal funds rate.
The final dimension by which the Taylor-
type rules analyzed in this article differ from
Taylors1993implementationisinthemeasure-
ment of inflation and the output gap. The ques-
tion of which measure of inflation policymakers
should attempt to stabilize may not be as simple
as it seems. Often the level and direction of
inflation movements differ for different mea-
sures of inflation. Furthermore, in face of diver-
gent movements, justifying a given choice of
inflation measure may prove difficult.
TheTaylorruleusesasitsmeasureofinflation
the percent change in the price deflator for GDP
over the previous four quarters. This article con-
siders four alternative inflation measuresCPI
inflation, core CPI inflation, GDPprice inflation,
and expected inflation (Chart 1). CPI inflation is
8 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYmeasured as the percent change in the consumer
price index over the previous four quarters. Core
CPI inflation is measured as the percent change in
the consumer price index excluding food and
energyoverthepreviousfourquarters.GDPprice
inflation is measured as the percent change in the
chain price index for GDP over the previous four
quarters.
12And,expectedinflationismeasuredas
the forecast of the percent change in the chain
priceindexforrealGDPoverthenextfourquarters
as reported by the Survey of Professional Fore-
casters.
These four measures represent both backward-
looking and forward-looking measures of infla-
tion. The first three inflation measures are back-
ward-lookinginthattheydescribeinflationovera
time period that has already past. By contrast, the
fourth inflation measure is forward-looking in
thatitdescribeswhatacollectionofprofessional
forecasters expect inflation to be over a future
time period. This last measure provides a direct
method to introduce forward-looking policy.
13
Expected inflation was included in the analysis
because many analysts and policymakers argue
that policy should be forward-looking, with funds
rate settings based on expected future inflation
rather than on past inflation.
14
Multiple measures of the output gap are consid-
ered because policymakers frequently comment
on difficulties in assessing the output gap.
15The
sixmeasuresoftheoutputgapconsideredinthis
article are shown in Chart 2. Each output gap is
the percentage difference between real GDP
and an estimate of potential real GDP. The six
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Chart 1
INFLATION MEASURES

























inflationmeasures of the output gap differ according to es-
timatesofpotentialrealGDP.Themeasureswere
chosen because they include different ap-
proaches to estimating potential real GDP and
can be easily obtained or easily estimated.
16 The
measures cover a broad range of sources, in-
cluding a government agency (the Congressional
Budget Office, or CBO), two international insti-
tutions(theInternationalMonetaryFund,orIMF,
and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation
and Development, or OECD), and a corporation
that produces commercial forecasts (Standard &
Poors DRI). These four measures are labeled by
data sourceCBO, IMF, OECD, and DRI, respec-
tively.Two othermeasuresarebasedonestimates
of potential real GDP constructed using standard
procedures. These measures are labeled Taylor
and Recursivethe former because it provides a
reasonably close approximation to the definition
of the output gap used by Taylor, and the latter
becauseitrepresentsarecursiveversionofthe
former. More details on the measures of the out-
put gap are provided in Appendix A.
II. ARE RULE RECOMMENDATIONS
ROBUST?
Thissectioninvestigatestherobustnessofrule
recommendations by examining the sensitivity
of Taylor-type rule recommendations to alterna-
tiveassumptions.Investigatingtherobustnessof
rule recommendations can be done by examin-
ing the range of rule recommendations that
would result across various measures of infla-
tion and the output gap, alternative estimates of
the equilibrium real rate, or different choices of
weights. The range of rule recommendations
may be interpreted, for instance, as the range of
recommendations provided to a policymaker by
a group of advisors, each using a Taylor-type





























Taylorrule, but each having a different view about the
specifics of the rule.
17 The analysis in this article
is limited to comparing operational rules, so the
timing adjustment discussed in the previous sec-
tion is usedmeasures of the output gap and
inflation are for the previous quarter.
How robust are rule recommendations to
alternative measures of inflation and
alternative estimates of the output gap?
The Taylor rule was based on specific choices
of inflation and output gap measures. As dis-
cussed in the previous section, other reasonable
measuresofinflationandtheoutputgapareavail-
able. To assess how robust rule recommenda-
tions are across alternative measures of inflation
and the output gap, recommendations of the fol-
lowing rule are examined:
funds rate(t)=inflation(t-1)+2.0
+ 0.5´(inflation(t-1)  2.0)
+ 0.5´(output gap(t-1)). (2)
As in the Taylor rule, the equilibrium real rate
and inflation target are set to 2.0 percent and the
weights in the adjustment factors are set to 0.5.
Chart 3 shows the range of rule recommenda-
tions obtained across inflation and output gap
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Chart 3
THE RANGE OF TAYLOR-TYPE RULE RECOMMENDATIONS























24 rule recommendations, and the minimum of the range corresponds to the minimum of the 24 rule recommendations. Taylor recom-
mendationswerecalculatedbytheauthorusingtheTaylorrulein(1)andthelatestversionofdataforrealGDPandtheGDPchainprice
index available in December 1998. These recommendations were based on the Taylor output gap described in Appendix A.
Sources: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, authors calculations.measures.
18 For reference, the chart also includes
actual policy as represented by the historical
value of the federal funds rate and the recom-
mendations of the Taylor rule.
19 The range of
rule recommendations is based on recommenda-
tions calculated for each of the six measures of
the output gap and each of the four measures of
inflation discussed in the previous section mak-
ing a total of 24 rule recommendations. In each
quarter,themaximumoftherangecorrespondsto
the maximum of the 24 rule recommendations
for that quarter, and the minimum of the range
corresponds to the minimum of the 24 rule rec-
ommendations. The range provides a measure of
the robustness of the rule recommendation to the
measurement of inflation and the output gap. The
widertherangeis,thelessrobusttherulerecom-
mendations are; and the narrower the range is,
the more robust the rule recommendations are.
Rulerecommendationsarenotrobustacross
alternative measures of inflation and the out-
putgap.From1983to1997,theaveragerange
is 3.1 percentage points.
20 The range varies
considerably, however, reaching its narrowest
at 1.8 percentage points in the first quarter of
1994 and reaching its widest at 5.5 percentage
points in the first quarter of 1987.
The robustness of rule recommendations to
the choice of output gap measure is isolated in
Chart 4. All recommendations in this chart
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Chart 4
THE RANGE OF TAYLOR-TYPE RULE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR DIFFERENT
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Note: The shaded area reflects the range of rule recommendations based on recommendations calculated for GDP price inflation and
each of the six measures of the output gap. In each quarter, the maximum of the range corresponds to the maximum of the six rule rec-
ommendations and the minimum of the range corresponds to the minimum of the six recommendations.
Sources: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, authors calculations.use the GDP price inflation measure of infla-
tion. Rather than showing six sets of rule recom-
mendations, one for each measure of the output
gap, only the maximum and minimum recom-
mendation are shown for each quarter. Although
the range of recommendations is considerably
narrower than in Chart 3, considerable sensi-
tivity of rule recommendations to the measure-
ment of the output gap is still apparent.
21 The
average range is 1.4 percentage points, with rule
recommendations in each quarter differing by at
least 0.9 percentage point and by as much as 2.4
percentage points.
22
The robustness of rule recommendations to the
choice of inflation measure is isolated in Chart 5.
All recommendations use the same measure
of the output gapthe CBO output gap. For
each quarter, only the maximum and minimum
recommendation over the four inflation mea-
suresis shown.Onceagain,althoughtherange
of recommendations is considerably narrower
than in Chart 3, rule recommendations remain
sensitive to the measurement of inflation. The
average range is 1.7 percentage points. In each
quarter, rule recommendations differ by at least
0.6 percentage point and by as much as 3.8 per-
centage points.
23
Summarizing, rule recommendations are not
robust across measures of inflation or measures
of the output gap. On average different assump-
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Chart 5
THE RANGE OF TAYLOR-TYPE RULE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR DIFFERENT
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Note: The shaded area reflects the range of rule recommendations based on recommendations calculated for the CBO output gap and
each of the four measures of inflation. In each quarter, the maximum of the range corresponds to the maximum of the four rule recom-
mendations and the minimum of the range corresponds to the minimum of the four recommendations.
Sources: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, authors calculations.tions on the measure of inflation and different
assumptions on the measure of the output gap
independently lead to a range of rule recommen-
dations roughly 1½ percentage points wide.
How robust are rule recommendations to
estimates of the equilibrium real interest
rate?
In addition to depending on inflation and the
output gap, recommendations for funds rate set-
tings from Taylor-type rules depend on the equi-
librium real rate. Because the equilibrium real
rate is not directly observable, however, it must
be estimated. Taylor set the equilibrium real
rate to 2.0 percent in his implementation. This
section provides alternative estimates of the
equilibrium real rate that depend on the choice
of an inflation measure and the choice of an
estimation sample period. The estimates vary
widely, implying considerable variation in the
rule recommendations.
The equilibrium real rate is commonly esti-
mated as the difference between the average
federal funds rate and the average inflation rate,
where both averages are calculated over a long
sample period.
24 A long sample period is recom-
mended because the equilibrium real rate is a
long-run concept. By using a long sample, possi-
ble cyclical swings in the real rate should be
averaged out. Additionally, for the United States,
trends in inflation movements evident in short
samplesmayresultinmisleadingestimatesofthe
equilibrium real rate. For instance, if the inflation
rate declines on average over a sample period,
then the estimate may exceed the equilibrium real
rate over the sample. While use of a long sample
hasadvantages,italsohasdisadvantages.Inpar-
ticular, if the equilibrium real rate has changed
over time, then a long sample may include infor-
mation from periods characterized by different
equilibrium real rates.
Estimates of the equilibrium real rate are pro-
vided in Table 1 for the four inflation measures
and for six sample periods. As seen in the table,
estimates are sensitive to the sample period and
the measure of inflation.
25 Sensitivity of esti-
mates of the equilibrium real rate to the measure
of inflation is evident by examining variation
across estimates within each sample period.
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Table 1
ESTIMATES OF THE EQUILIBRIUM REAL RATE
Inflation measure
Estimation sample CPI inflation Core CPI inflation GDP price inflation Expected inflation
1960-97 2.04 1.99 2.40
1965-97 2.10 2.06 2.51
1970-97 2.11 2.09 2.60 2.91
1975-97 2.35 2.12 2.89 2.91
1983-97 3.13 2.71 3.44 3.04
1987-97 2.34 2.15 2.86 2.60
Notes: Table entries are estimates of the equilibrium real rate calculated as the average nominal federal funds rate less the
average inflation rate. For each entry, the column heading provides the measure of inflation used in the calculation and the
row label provides the sample over which averages were taken.Estimates differ across inflation measures by as
little as 0.4 percentage point (over the 1960-97
sample) or as much as 0.8 percentage point (over
the 1970-97 and 1975-97 samples).
Estimates of the equilibrium real rate are some-
what more sensitive to the sample period than to
the measure of inflation. Estimates are least
sensitive to the sample period when core CPI
inflation is the measure of inflation, displaying a
range of 0.7 percentage point across the different
periods. Estimates are most sensitive to the sam-
pleperiodwhenCPIinflationisthemeasureused,
displaying a range of 1.1 percentage points.
Estimates calculated over 1983-97 are higher
than estimates calculated over any other sample.
Since all measures of inflation were declining on
average over this sample, the Federal Reserve
may have been in a tightening mode, suggesting
that estimates based on this sample may overstate
the equilibrium real rate.
26
Rule recommendations are quite sensitive to
estimates of the equilibrium real rate. Since the
rule recommendation equals the sum of the equilib-
rium real rate, inflation, and two adjustment
factors, any change in an estimate of the equilib-
rium real rate implies an equal sized change in
the recommended federal funds rate in Taylor-
type rules without smoothing. For example, rule
recommendations based on the highest GDP-
price-inflation estimate of the equilibrium real
rate are over one percentage point higher than rule
recommendations based on the lowest GDP-price-
inflation estimate.
27 Rule recommendations based
on the highest GDP-price-inflation estimate of
theequilibriumrealratearenearly1½percentage
points higher than rule recommendations based
on the Taylor setting of 2.0 percent.
28 Such dif-
ferences are only slightly smaller than ranges
based on different output gaps and ranges based
on different inflation measures.
Summarizing, rule recommendations are not
very robust to estimates of the equilibrium real
rate. Recommendations are almost as sensitive
to estimates of the equilibrium real rate as they
are to the choice of inflation and output gap
measures.
How robust are rule recommendations
to alternative weights?
The final assumption with respect to which
robustness of rule recommendations is exam-
ined refers to the size of weights in the adjust-
ment factors. The Taylor rule used weights of
0.5 in both adjustment factors. Weights of 0.5
represent fairly modest responses of policy to
inflation and output gaps. Setting weights to 1.0,
for example, would represent a somewhat more
aggressive policy response.
29 Equal weights
imply that policy is equally responsive to devia-
tions of inflation from the inflation target and
deviations of real GDPfrom potential real GDP.
Unequal weights may be more appropriate if one
goal is to be emphasized over the other. Also,
because the output gap may be seen as a signal
of future inflationary pressures, unequal weights
may suggest a different emphasis on future
inflation than on inflation over the previous
four quarters. Views on the appropriate settings
for the weights likely differ across policy advi-
sors, and also across policymakers.
30
To assess how robust rule recommendations
aretodifferentassumptionsabouttheresponsive-
ness of policy to the output gap and deviations
of inflation from the target, recommendations
of the following rule are examined:
funds rate(t) = inflation(t-1) + 2.0
+ weight1´(inflation(t-1)  2.0)
+ weight2´(output gap(t-1)), (3)
with weight1 and weight2 set to either 0.5 or
1.0.
31 Four different weight combinations are
considered: weight1 and weight2 both set to 0.5;
weight1setto0.5andweight2setto1.0;weight1
set to 1.0 and weight2 set to 0.5; and, weight1
and weight2 set to 1.0. For a given choice of
inflation measure and output gap measure, these
ECONOMIC REVIEW l SECOND QUARTER 1999 15four weight combinations imply four rule recom-
mendations each quarter. The average width of
the range between the maximum and minimum
recommendations for each quarter provides a
measure of the robustness of the rule recommen-
dation to the weight assumption. The larger the
average, the less robust the rule recommenda-
tions; and the smaller the average, the more
robust the rule recommendations.
Rule recommendations are not very robust to
alternativeweightassumptions.Table2reportsthe
average range over 1983-97 for different inflation
and output gap measures.
32 The average range
varies from 1.14 percentage points to 2.15
percentage points depending on the chosen
measures of inflation and the output gap. The
average range over all pairings of inflation and
output gap measures is 1.6 percentage points.
33
When compared to results obtained earlier in
this section, this result suggests that rule recom-
mendations are about as sensitive to the weight
assumption as to the choice of inflation and out-
put gap measures.
This section has illustrated that Taylor-type
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Table 2
ROBUSTNESS OF RULE RECOMMENDATIONS TO ALTERNATIVE
WEIGHTS: STATISTICS ON THE RANGE OF RULE RECOMMENDATIONS



































































































Note: The average, minimum, and maximum width of the range of rule recommendations is calculated over 1983-97. Each
quarter, the range of rule recommendations reflects the difference between the maximum and the minimum of the rule
recommendations calculated using four different weight assumptions.rule recommendations are not very robust across
reasonable variations in assumptions. In particu-
lar, alternative reasonable assumptions on any
one of the measures of inflation, the measure of
the output gap, or the choice of weights used in
the adjustment factors, lead to roughly a 1½- per-
centage-point range of rule recommendations.
Sucharangeisquitelargewhencomparedtotyp-
ical policy decisions. For instance, between
March 1, 1984, and December 31, 1998, the larg-
est change in the Federal Reserves target for the
federal funds rate at any one time was 0.75 per-
centage point.
34 Even when policy actions over
this period are aggregated to a quarterly frequency,
the absolute change in the Federal Reserves tar-
get for the federal funds rate from the last day of
one quarter to the last day of the next quarter
exceeded 0.75 percentage point only twice.
35
Policy rules may aid in focusing policy discus-
sions. But, lack of robustness with respect to the
measurementofinflationandtheoutputgap,esti-
mates of the equilibrium real rate, and settings for
weights limit the usefulness of rules to recom-
mend funds rate settings in real time.
36
III. ARE RULE RECOMMENDATIONS
RELIABLE?
When faced with the decision about how to ad-
just the federal funds rate, policymakers naturally
prefer looking to reliable policy rules for advice.
Oneapproachtoevaluatingthereliabilityof a pol-
icy rule is to assess the ability of the rule to
replicate, or fit, past policy settings regarded fa-
vorably by policymakers.
37 If past policy actions
were successful, policymakers wanting to base
current decisions on a similar strategy might find
rules whose recommendations are close to past
federal funds rate settings more reliable.
38
However, rules whose recommendations fit his-
toricalfundsratesettingswellmaynotactuallydo
a reasonable job at describing what motivated
policymakers to adjust the funds rate. In particu-
lar, even if rule recommendations replicate past
federal funds rate settings, the rule may not be
reliableifassumptionsembeddedintherulespeci-
fication are inappropriate. For instance, policy-
makers may have exercised flexibility in setting
policy in the past. A preference for flexibility
may be signaled, for instance, by evidence that
economic events outside the scope of the rule
influenced past policy decisions.
39Consequently,
when evaluating the reliability of Taylor-type
rules it is important to examine the extent to
which Taylor-type rules actually represent the
process behind policy decision making.
This section evaluates the ability of Taylor-
type rules to fit historical federal funds rate
settings. Taylor-type rules with and without
smoothing are estimated using regression analy-
sis. Estimating the rule improves the ability of
the rule to provide recommendations that repli-
cate historical funds rate settings. Goodness of
fit is measured using the average of the absolute
deviations (that is, the mean absolute deviation)
of historical federal funds rate settings from rec-
ommendations of estimated rules. In addition,
theappropriatenessofassumptionsembeddedin
the rule specifications is discussed.
How well do recommendations from
estimated rules fit past federal funds
rate settings?
Thissectioncomparesrecommendationsfrom
estimated Taylor-type policy rules to historical
settings of the federal funds rate. The following
Taylor-type rule without smoothing is estimated:
funds rate(t) = constant + (1+a)
´inflation(t-1) +b´(output gap(t-1)). (4)
In this expression, the equilibrium real rate and
inflation target are subsumed in constant, a is
theweightintheinflationgapadjustmentfactor,
andbis the weight in the output gap adjustment
factor.
40 For larger values of a, recommended
funds rate settings are more responsive to devia-
tions of inflation from the inflation target. For
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Table 3












CBO CPI inflation .01 -.01 1.50
CBO Core CPI inflation .48 .14 1.30
CBO GDP Price inflation .88 .32 1.17
CBO Expected inflation 1.37 .38 .70
OECD CPI inflation .01 -.02 1.50
OECD Core CPI inflation .42 .12 1.33
OECD GDP Price inflation .71 .29 1.23
OECD Expected inflation 1.21 .36 .79
IMF CPI inflation -.06 .18 1.43
IMF Core CPI inflation .36 .22 1.29
IMF GDP Price inflation .65 .35 1.14
IMF Expected inflation 1.09 .34 .75
DRI CPI inflation -.01 -.10 1.49
DRI Core CPI inflation .51 .10 1.31
DRI GDP Price inflation .94 .28 1.20
DRI Expected inflation 1.55 .39 .68
Taylor CPI inflation -.12 .18 1.40
Taylor Core CPI inflation .28 .18 1.31
Taylor GDP Price inflation .53 .27 1.16
Taylor Expected inflation .99 .26 .80
Recursive CPI inflation .03 -.10 1.50
Recursive Core CPI inflation .41 .00 1.34
Recursive GDP Price inflation .70 .13 1.24
Recursive Expected inflation 1.31 .24 .81
Note: Bold-face entries are significantly different from 0.5, the weight used by Taylor (1993).larger values of b, recommended funds rate set-
tings are more responsive to deviations of real
GDP from potential real GDP.
Estimates of constant, a, and b are chosen to
minimize the squared deviations of the actual
funds rate from the rule recommendation.
41 Esti-
mates ofa andbobtained using data for 1983-97
are provided in Table 3 for different measures of
inflation and the output gap. Estimates obtained
using data for 1987-97 are provided in Table 4.
Boldface entries are significantly different from
0.5, the weight chosen by Taylor. In both tables,
the final column reports the mean absolute devia-
tion of the historical funds rate from recommen-
dations of estimated rules.
Several results are apparent. First, recom-
mendations from estimated rules do not fit his-
torical policy very well. Second, estimated rules
that use expected inflation fit historical policy
best. Third, estimated weights are similar to the
values assumed by Taylor.
The poor fits of estimated policy rules are evi-
dent in the sizable differences between rule rec-
ommendations and historical federal funds rate
settings. With the exception of specifications
that used expected inflation, the mean absolute
deviation of rule recommendations from histori-
cal funds rate settings exceeded one percentage
point (Table 3). And, although Taylor-type rules
capture the late-1980s increase and subsequent
early-1990s decrease in the federal funds rate,
rulerecommendations,includingthosebasedon
expectedinflation,typicallydeviatefromhistor-
ical policy for extended periods (Chart 6).
42
Deviations are pronounced in the early 1990s
whenrulerecommendationsdeclinebylessthan
the actual funds rate. With the exception of rules
that use expected inflation, recommendations
areconsiderablylowerthantheactualfundsrate
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Chart 6
RECOMMENDATIONS OF ESTIMATED TAYLOR-TYPE RULES FOR DIFFERENT



























inflationin the mid-1980s, and in the early-1990s rule rec-
ommendations decline roughly a year after the
funds rate actually declined. And, recommen-
dations from rules that use expected inflation
rebound less than the actual funds rate in the
mid-1990s.
Although none of the estimated policy rules fit
historical policy well, rules that use expected infla-
tionare closertohistoricalfundsratesettingsthan
rules that use other measures of inflation.
43 For
eachmeasureoftheoutputgap,themeanabsolute
deviation of rule recommendations from actual pol-
icyis smallest for specifications that use expected
inflation (Table 3). This result provides some evi-
dence to suggest that, over the period examined,
monetary policy may have been forward- looking.
44
Comments by policymakers support this interpreta-
tion. For instance, Chairman Greenspan (1988)
commented that for much of 1987, Federal Reserve
policyleanedinthedirectionofcounteringpotential
inflationary tendencies in the economy. And,
in a speech on April 24, 1997, Governor Meyer
remarked that the 0.25-percentage-point increase
in the federal funds rate target on March 26,




to be in the future, absent a policy change.
The third result suggests that weights imple-
mented by Taylor may be empirically justified.
Whenestimatedover1983-97,estimatesofweights
are, in most cases, insignificantly different from
the 0.5 settings assumed by Taylor. However,
results are somewhat sensitive to the estimation
sample period.
45 Estimates of the weight in the
output gap adjustment in Table 3 are insignifi-
cantly different from the Taylor weight of 0.5, but
all point estimates are smaller than 0.5. When
estimatedover1987-97,however,pointestimates
of the weight in the output gap tend to be larger
than0.5,andinmostcases,significantlyso.Simi-
larly, although estimates of the weight in the
inflation gap adjustment in Table 3 are insignifi-
cantly different from 0.5 for all measures of
inflationexceptGDPpriceinflation,andinmost
cases significantly larger than 0.5 for GDP price
inflation, results differ when estimated over
1987-97. In particular, as shown in Table 4,
estimates of the weight on GDP price inflation
are significantly larger than 0.5 for only the DRI
output gap, and estimates of the weight on the
inflationgaparefrequentlysignificantlysmaller
than 0.5 for the other measures of inflation.
Adisturbing aspect of the estimates in Table
4 is the frequent appearance of negative infla-
tion weights. Since the negative inflation weights
occur for only a subset of inflation measures and
output gap measures, these estimates might signal
that the corresponding measures of inflation or
output gaps do not bear close resemblance to
measures used by policymakers. Alternatively,
these estimates might signal that the actual pol-
icy decision-making process diverged consider-
ably from the simple rules examined in this
article. This issue is discussed in more detail
later in this section.
Do estimated rules with smoothing fit past
policy settings better?
The Taylor-type rules examined so far implic-
itly assumed that policymakers do not smooth
funds rate adjustments. This section examines
whether recommendations fit past policy set-
tings better when rules are generalized to incor-
porate smoothing. In addition, estimates of the
degree of smoothness are compared to Taylors
implicit setting of zero.
The following Taylor-type rule without smooth-
ing is estimated:
funds rate (t) =r´(funds rate (t-1))
+ (1-r)´(unsmoothed target(t))
unsmoothed target (t) = constant + (1+a)
´inflation(t-1) +b´(output gap(t-1)). (5)
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CBO CPI inflation .82 -.10 .79
CBO Core CPI inflation 1.05 .40 .52
CBO GDP Price inflation .92 .33 .57
CBO Expected inflation .73 .82 .54
OECD CPI inflation -.37 1.10 .79
OECD Core CPI inflation -.08 1.23 .72
OECD GDP Price inflation -.11 1.11 .77
OECD Expected inflation .40 .90 .69
IMF CPI inflation -.51 .90 .60
IMF Core CPI inflation -.38 .93 .56
IMF GDP Price inflation -.32 .89 .55
IMF Expected inflation -.03 .78 .57
DRI CPI inflation .09 .60 .94
DRI Core CPI inflation .86 1.01 .65
DRI GDP Price inflation .68 .82 .69
DRI Expected inflation 1.29 .66 .55
Taylor CPI inflation -.76 .79 .59
Taylor Core CPI inflation -.82 .82 .62
Taylor GDP Price inflation -.71 .79 .60
Taylor Expected inflation -.54 .74 .60
Recursive CPI inflation -.39 .83 .72
Recursive Core CPI inflation -.10 .91 .57
Recursive GDP Price inflation -.08 .85 .59
Recursive Expected inflation .37 .71 .55
Note: Bold-face entries are significantly different from 0.5, the weight used by Taylor (1993).In this specification, r represents the degree of
smoothness in policy decisions and, as before,
the equilibrium real rate and inflation target
are subsumed in constant,a is the weight in the
inflation gap adjustment factor, andbis the weight
in the output gap adjustment factor.
46 If the
smoothness parameter r is set to zero, then the
above specification simplifies to a Taylor-type
rulewithoutsmoothingasin(4).Asthesmoothness
parameterincreasesfromzerotoone,therulerec-
ommends a smoother series of federal funds rate
settings in the sense that changes in the recom-




vided in Table 5 for expected inflation and the six
measuresoftheoutputgap.
48Bold-faceestimates
ofa andbare significantly different from 0.5, the
weight chosen by Taylor; and boldface estimates
ofr are significantly different from 0.0, the value
implicitly assumed by Taylor.
Estimatesofthedegreeofsmoothnessaresignifi-
cantly different from zero and suggestive of con-
siderable smoothness in historical policy setting.
Otherresultsarebroadlysimilartothoseobtained
without smoothing. Estimates of the weight in
theoutputgapadjustmentareinsignificantlydif-
ferent from the Taylor weight of 0.5. And, point
estimates of the inflation weight for expected
inflation are generally larger than the Taylor
weight of 0.5, although not significantly so.
The significance of the smoothness parameter
is indicative of a related result. Recommenda-
tions from estimated forward-looking rules with
smoothing fit historical funds rate settings better
than estimated rules without smoothing. Mean
absolute deviations in Table 5 are 40-50 percent
lower than mean absolute deviations in the cor-
responding rows of Table 3. In other words,
wheninflationismeasuredusingexpectedinfla-
tion, allowing for smoothing improves the fit of
the rule recommendations by 40-50 percent.
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CBO 1.42 .49 .76 .34
OECD 1.22 .51 .80 .36
IMF 1.05 .42 .79 .36
DRI 1.66 .52 .75 .32
Taylor .93 .28 .82 .37
Recursive 1.34 .32 .81 .36
Notes: Bold-face estimates ofaandbare significantly different from 0.5, the weight used by Taylor (1993). Bold-face esti-
matesofraresignificantlydifferentfrom0,thedegreeofsmoothingintheTaylorrule.Resultsareforexpectedinflationas
a measure of inflation.Chart 7 shows how deviations of rule recom-
mendations from historical policy are reduced
whenestimatedpolicyrulesaccountforsmoothing
of funds rate adjustments. Deviations of three rule
recommendations from actual policy are illus-
trated. Deviations are calculated as the difference
between a rule recommendation and actual policy
with positive deviations occurring in periods
where the rule would have recommended tighter
policy. One recommendation corresponds to the
rule recommendation with Taylors weights and
settings for the equilibrium real rate and inflation
target (Taylors assumptions), the second corre-
spondstotherulerecommendationwithestimated
weights (Estimated), and the third corresponds to
the rule recommendation with estimated weights
and smoothing (Estimated with smoothing). All
recommendations were calculated using the CBO
output gap and expected inflation. Since recom-
mendations based on other measures of inflation
do not come as close to matching historical pol-
icy, Chart 7 provides a conservative view of the
deviations.
Deviations based on the rule with Taylor
weights are persistent and sizable. The rule would
have recommended setting the funds rate roughly
3 percentage points lower over 1983-84, roughly
0.7 percentage point lower over 1988-91, roughly
1 percentage point higher over 1992-94, and
roughly 0.7 percentage point lower over 1995-
96. For the rule with estimated weights, persis-
tent deviations of rule recommendations from
policy are somewhat smaller and less frequent.
For example, the rule with estimated weights
would have recommended setting the funds rate
roughly1percentagepointhigherover1991-94,
and roughly 0.8 percentage point lower over
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Note: Deviations are calculated as the rule recommendation minus actual policy. Rule recommendations use the CBO output gap and
expected inflation.1995-97. Persistent deviations are even smaller
for the rule with estimated weights and smooth-
ing. For instance, over 1991-93, the recom-
mendedfundsratesettingsexceedactualpolicyby
only 0.5 percentage point over 1991-93. Although
the general contours of rule recommendations
appeartomatchthoseofactualpolicy,forthetwo
rules without smoothing, deviations of rule rec-
ommendations from actual policy are economi-
cally significant.
49
The results of this section are not overly support-
ive of the view that Taylor-type rules are reliable.
With the possible exception of estimated for-
ward-looking rules with smoothing, deviations of
rule recommendations from actual policy tend to
be sizable, persistent, and economically significant.
However, perhaps an even more important ques-
tion is whether a rule that happens to do a reason-
able job at replicating the path of the funds rate
historically also does a reasonable job at describing
the policy decision-making process.
Do Taylor-type rules describe the
decision-making process of the
Federal Reserve?
Ifrulerecommendationshappentomatchfunds
rate settings but do not capture the process by
which the funds rate was set, then the ability of
theruletocontinuetomatchpolicyinthefutureis
questionable.
50 The Taylor-type rules examined
include an implicit assumption that federal funds
rate settings were based on the output gap, devia-
tions of inflation from the inflation target, and,
possibly, the previous setting of the federal funds
rate. Additionally, the equilibrium real rate and
the inflation target were assumed to be constant.
If any of these assumptions are not valid, then
estimated policy rules may misrepresent the deci-
sion-making process.
In fact, according to testimony and speeches by
members of the Federal Reserve Board, these
assumptions are questionable. On many occasions,
monetary policy decisions appear to have been
influenced by economic events not well summa-
rized by inflation and the output gap.
Then-ChairmanVolcker,inJuly1985suggested
that monetary policy actions had been influ-
enced by strength in the foreign exchange value
of the dollar.
51 Then in 1988, Chairman
Greenspan noted, the stock market crash of late
October [1987] shifted the balance of risks, and
the Federal Reserve modified its approach to
monetary policy accordingly. In particular, [the
Federal Reserve] took steps to ensure adequate
liquidity in the financial system during the
period of serious turmoil, and  encouraged
some decline in short-term interest rates. (Green-
span, March 1988). Congressional testimony by
Chairman Greenspan suggests that policy deci-
sions during the 1989-93 period were driven, at
least partially, by discretionary responses to finan-
cial strains.
52 More recently, Governor Meyer
suggested that the three 25-basis-point reduc-
tions in the federal funds rate target made in the
second half of 1998 were not justified by typical
Taylor rule prescriptions (Meyer 1999). Rather,
he claimed these changes in policy were in
response to dramatic financial market turbulence
following the Russian default and devaluation and
reduced confidence of some in the traditional
model of inflation dynamics.
Additionally, comments by Governor Meyer
in 1996 on opportunistic monetary policy may
be taken as suggesting that the inflation target
may not have been constant (Meyer 1996). And,
Vice Chairman Blinder has suggested that the
equilibrium real rate is not a fixed number
(Blinder).
As the Taylor-type rules examined in the pre-
vious section do not account for these aspects of
policy, it is likely that the estimated policy rules
may misrepresent the decision-making process.
In particular, statements by policymakers suggest
that often information and events outside the
scope of Taylor-type rule specifications influ-
encepolicyactions.Consequently,thereliability
of Taylor-type rules is questionable.
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This article has focused on the usefulness of
policy rules to policymakers as they decide how
toadjustthefederalfundsrate.Thearticlepres-
ents evidence to suggest that the usefulness of
Taylor-type rule recommendations to policy-
makers faced with real-time policy decisions is
limited. Rule recommendations are not robust to
reasonable minor variations in assumptions, and
their reliability is questionable.
Although recommendations from Taylor-type
rules are likely to be of limited use to policymak-
ers facing real-time policy decisions, Taylor-type
rules may be useful to policymakers in other
ways. One, because Taylor-type rules retain a
simple structure and embed crucial aspects of
monetary policy, they serve as a simple and eas-
ily understood starting point for thinking about
monetary policy (Meyer 1999, October 1998,
and 1997; Blinder). Two, they may provide a
convenient communication tool for focusing policy
discussions and for educating the public about
some of the issues of concern to the Federal
Reserve. And three, most forecasting models
require analysts to specify a policy rule.
53 But,
the simple structure of Taylor rules clearly has
disadvantages, hiding the fact that many aspects
of rule specification are subject to considerable
uncertaintyandignoringthepotentialfordiscre-
tionary responses to special circumstances.
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APPENDIX A
This appendix provides more information
oneachofthesixmeasuresoftheoutputgap
consideredinthearticle.Inallcases,theout-
put gap is expressed as a percent of potential
real GDP, calculated by multiplying 100 times
thenaturallogarithmoftheratioofrealGDP
to an estimate of potential real GDP:
output gap = 100´Ln (real GDP/estimate
of potential real GDP).
Real GDP is measured using the version of
1992 chained dollar real GDP available in
December 1998. Differences in estimates of
potentialrealGDPaccountfordifferencesin
the six measures of the output gap.
The CBO output gap was constructed using
the Congressional Budget Offices estimate
ofpotentialoutput.CBOusesaproduction
function approach to estimate historical values
of potential output. The production function
approach uses a neoclassical production func-
tion, combined with assumptions about the
growth of the labor force and the rate of sav-
ing to determine how potential output will
grow over the long term (Arnold).
The OECD output gap was estimated using
an interpolated series for potential output.
This potential output series was interpolated
from a semiannual potential output series
constructed from semiannual OECD estimates
of the U.S. output gap and real GDPdata. The
semiannual output gap series obtained from
the OECD is based on a potential output
series estimated using a production function
approach. Giorno, Richardson, Roseveare,
and van den Noord (1995) provide more
information on the OECD approach to esti-
mating potential output. More information
on the interpolation procedure is available
from the author on request.
The IMF output gap also was estimated
usinganinterpolatedseriesforpotentialout-
put.Thispotentialoutputserieswasinterpo-
lated from an annual potential output series
constructed from annual IMF estimates of
the U.S. output gap and real GDP data. The
original annual output gap series obtained
from the IMF is based on a potential output
seriesestimatedusingasegmentedtrendap-
proach. This approach assumes that the rate
of growth of potential output changes at
specific structural points, but is constant be-
tweenthesepoints.DeMasi(1997)provides
more information on IMF estimates of po-
tential output. More information on the in-
terpolation procedure is available from the
author on request.
TheDRIoutputgapwasconstructedusing
Standard & Poors DRI estimate of potential
output. DRI also uses a production function
approach to estimate historical values of
potential output.
The Taylor output gap was constructed
using a linear-trend estimate of potential out-
put. The fitted value obtained in a regression
of the natural logarithm of real GDP on a
constant and linear time trend was used as
the linear-trend estimate of potential out-
put. The estimation used 25 years of data,
extending from the first quarter of 1973
through the fourth quarter of 1997. This
approach assumes that the rate of growth of
potential output is constant over the estima-
tion sample. This measure of the output gap
is similar to that used by Taylor as he used a
linear-trend estimate of potential output.ENDNOTES
1 The results of this article provide empirical support for the
view, voiced by Taylor (1993), that operating monetary pol-
icy by mechanically following a specific policy rule is not
practical.
2 The Federal Reserve sets a target for the federal funds rate.
However, the actual funds rate may differ from this rate on a
day-to-day basis. Institutional details are provided in
Meulendyke (1998), pages 42-48, and 52-56. See also
Rudebusch (1995) and Bonser-Neal, Roley, and Sellon (1997).
To simplify exposition, this article does not distinguish
betweenthetargetofthefundsrateandtheactualfundsrate.
3 In general, a monetary policy rule describes a systematic
process by which the central bank adjusts a variable it con-
trols (or targets) as the economy fluctuates. This definition
admits a huge array of possible policy rules given the multi-
ple possible variables targeted or controlled by monetary
policy and the preponderance of possible descriptors of the
state of the economy. A list of variables that might be targeted
orcontrolledbymonetarypolicymayincludethemanymea-
sures of money and reserves, the discount rate, the federal
fundsrate,exchangerates,andmonetaryconditionsindexes.
The gold standard may be seen as an early example of a pol-
icyruleinwhichcountriessoughttomaintainafixedpriceof
their national money in terms of gold. Friedmans (1967)
prescription that the monetary authority adopt a policy of
achieving a constant rate of money growth is another exam-
ple of a policy rule. McCallum (1988) proposes a rule which
would target the growth rate of the monetary base at the sum
of 3 percent less the average growth rate of base velocity
plus a fraction of the deviations of nominal GNP from the
target path. Bryant, Hooper, and Mann (1993) examine
four monetary policy regimes: a version of money target-
ing, nominal-income targeting, a regime that targets the
sum of real GNP and the inflation rate, and a particular
form of exchange-rate targeting. The short-term rate of
interest rate was specified as the primary instrument for
monetary policy in each regime. Meltzer (1996) proposes
anadaptiveruleformoneygrowthtoachievezeroexpected
inflation.
4 The Federal Reserve does not have a specific numerical
target for a particular measure of inflation. Rather, the Fed-
eralReservestatesitsinflationgoalasachievingpricesta-
bility.
5 Then-Vice Chairman Blinder discussed four crucial
aspects of the Taylor rule in remarks on January 10, 1996.
The aspects of policy discussed in the text draw on this
speech and on Meyer (1996, 1997, October 1998).
6To simplify the exposition, the label Taylor will hence-
forth refer to the original Taylor rule. The label Tay-
lor-type will refer to rule specifications that are similar to
theTaylorrulebutthatmayincludedifferentassumptions.
7 The Taylor rule recommends federal funds rate settings
based on recent inflation and the output gap. For example,
if inflation over the previous four quarters equaled 4 per-
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However, because Taylor used a shorter
sample and an earlier version of real GDP
data, his estimates of the output gap would
have differed from the so-called Taylor out-
put gap series constructed for this article.
The Recursive output gap was constructed
using a recursive linear-trend estimate of
potential output. Recursive linear-trend esti-
mates of potential output were based on a
series of regressions. The estimate of poten-
tial output for a given quarter was the fitted
value obtained in a regression of the natural
logarithm of real GDP on a constant and lin-
ear time trend, using data over the 25 years
ending in that quarter. For instance, the esti-
mate of potential output in the second quarter
of 1994 was obtained from the regression
estimated using data from the third quarter of
1969 through the second quarter of 1994.
Consequently, the Recursive and Taylor esti-
mates of potential output are the same in the
fourth quarter of 1997.cent and the output gap equaled 1 percent then the Taylor
rule would recommend setting the federal funds rate at 7.5
percent. The federal funds rate is targeted to equal inflation
over the previous four quarters (4 percent) plus the equilib-
rium real rate (2 percent) plus one-half of the inflation gap
(0.5 times (4 percent-2 percent)) plus one-half of the output
gap (0.5 times 1percent). Thus, in this example, the funds
rate is targeted at 7.5 percent (4+2+0.5(4-2)+0.5(1)=7.5).
8 The Bureau of Economic Analysis revises previously pub-
lished estimates of the National Income and Product
Accounts data annually. These revisions reflect source data
that are more complete, more detailed, and otherwise more
appropriate than data that were previously incorporated and
may also incorporate methodological improvements and
redefinitions of variables. Comprehensive revisions differ
from annual NIPA revisions because of the scope of the
changes and the number of years subject to revision. Com-
prehensive revisions incorporate: (1) definitional and
classificational changes that more accurately portray the
evolving U.S. economy, (2) statistical changes that reflect
new and improved methodologies and incorporate new and
revised source data, and (3) presentational changes. Some
recent discussions of annual and comprehensive revisions
can be found in the Donahoe (1996), Parker (1997), Seskin
(1998), and Grimm and Parker (1998).
9Another approach is to use a forecast of the contemporane-
ous quarter data.
10 Orphanides (1997) estimated Taylor-type rules over
1987-92 using ex post revised data and real-time data. Using
Federal Reserve staff forecasts, he also investigated whether
forward-looking specifications describe policy better than
backward-looking specifications. Rudebusch and Svensson
(1998) compare the properties of a collection of rules with
varying weights in a small macroeconometric model of the
U.S. economy. Judd and Rudebusch (1998) estimate Tay-
lor-type rules for samples delineated by the terms of recent
Fed Chairmen. Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1998b) estimate
forward-looking Taylor-type rules.
11 Minutes from meetings held in early 1994 suggest that
changes in the funds rate may have been smoothed in
response to concerns of members of the FOMC about the
impact of policy changes on financial markets. For example,
the minutes of the FOMC meeting held on February 3-4,
1994, note: In the course of the Committees discussion, a
number of members endorsed a policy move that would
involve only a slight adjustment toward a less accommoda-
tive degree of reserve pressure. These members recognized
that evolving economic conditions might well justify a
somewhat greater policy adjustment. They believed, how-
ever, that even a slight move at this time was likely to have a
particularly strong impact on financial markets because it
would be the first policy change after a long hiatus and
indeed the first tightening action in about five years. The
minutes of the FOMC meeting held on March 22, 1994,
note: Many members noted that money market interest
rateswouldhavetorisebyarelativelysizableamountfrom
currentlevels,givenunderlyingeconomicconditions,buta
majority indicated a preference for another small move at
this time. Many were concerned about a possible overreac-
tion in financial markets that had become quite sensitive
and volatile since early February.
12 The differences between GDP price inflation measured
using the GDP deflator and the GDP chain price index are
smallless than 0.1 percentage point in any quarter during
1983-97.
13 The output gap adjustment factor provides an indirect
method to introduce forward-looking policy. As discussed
earlier, because the output gap may signal future inflation-
ary pressures, the output gap adjustment factor may be
interpreted as representing forward-looking policy.
14 Chairman Greenspan testified on May 27, 1994: The
challenge of monetary policy is to interpret current data on
theeconomyandfinancialmarketswithaneyetoanticipat-
ingfutureinflationaryorcontractionaryforcesandtocoun-
tering them by taking action in advance. Governor Meyer
(April 24, 1997) noted that he is inclined to believe in the
forward-lookingapproachandthereforeinpreemptivepol-
icy. Moreover, he justified forward-looking policy in his
comments on March 16, 1998, that [a] good reason for
responding to forecasts of inflation is that the effects of
monetary policy on the economy mostly occur about a year
from now. In a discussion of monetary policy in Canada,
Duguay and Poloz (1994) noted that a key implication of
the interaction between policy objectives and mainstream
viewsofhowtheeconomyworksisthatpolicyformulation
must be forward-looking. Using Federal Reserve forecasts
and preliminary data available at the time policy choices
were made, McNees (1986) found evidence that monetary
policymaking has been forward-looking as well as back-
ward-looking. Orphanides (1997) used Federal Reserve
forecasts of inflation to estimate forward-looking policy
rules. Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1998b) estimate for-
ward-looking policy rules for pre- and post-1979. Clarida,
Gali, and Gertler (1998a) report that Germany, Japan and
the U.S. have pursued forward-looking monetary policy.
Batini and Haldane (1999) use the Bank of England fore-
casting model to show that inflation-forecast-based rules
confer some real benefits.
15 Chairman Greenspan (1995) testified that one factor in
judging the inflationary risks in the economy is the poten-
tial for expansion of our productive capacity. If potential
GDP is growing rapidly, actual output can also continue to
grow rapidly without intensifying pressures on resources.
 Knowing in advance our true growth potential obvi-
28 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYouslywouldbeusefulinsettingpolicy.GovernorGramlich
(1998) commented: For the Fed to lean against the wind of
outputgaps,ithastoknowwhattheoutputgapsare,andthat
toocanbecomequitetrickyasunemploymentapproachesits
desired level. Governor Meyer, in remarks on April 9, 1998
noted that there is some question about whether or not or, at
least, to what degree the economy is operating beyond the
point of sustainable capacity. Governor Ferguson (1998)
discussed difficulties in assessing the amount of slack in the
economy.
16 The analysis does not include a forecast of the real output
gap for several reasons. The main reason is that forecasts of
the output gap are not readily available. For instance, fore-
cast surveys, such as the Survey of Professional Forecasters,
generally do not ask survey participants for their forecasts of
either potential output or of the output gap. Orphanides
(1997) constructed real-time forecasts of the output gap
combining Federal Reserve staff forecasts of real GNP or
real GDP and estimates of potential output.
17 Taylor (1993) also suggested examining ranges of rule
recommendations across different variants of a policy rule.
18 Rather than setting the equilibrium real rate and inflation
target to 2.0 percent, it may be more appropriate to choose
settings that depend on the chosen measure of inflation, for
instance. If settings for the equilibrium real rate and inflation
target are allowed to vary with the chosen measure of infla-
tion, then a narrower range of rule recommendations may be
obtained.
19 Taylor rule recommendations may differ somewhat from




inflation constructed using the GDP chain price index. And,
while the Taylor output gap used in the rule recommenda-
tionsinthechartisconstructedinasimilarfashiontotheout-
put gap used by Taylor, the underlying real GDP data is
different.Thisarticleusesalongersampleandamorerecent
version of real GDP data.
20 Taylor examined the performance of the Taylor rule dur-
ing the 1987-92 period.
21 Kuttner (1992) comments that uncertainty in estimates of
the output gap may mean that situations requiring policy
actionmaynotberecognizableuntillateron.Hefurthersug-
gests that frequently the best response to uncertainty is to
adopt a wait-and-see attitude until more information
becomes available.
22 The average, maximum, and minimum widths of the
rangearenotsensitivetothechosenmeasureofpriceinflation.
23 The average, maximum, and minimum widths of the
range are not sensitive to the chosen measure of the output
gap.
24 An alternative approach is to assume that the policy
decisions were made according to the recommendations of
a Taylor-type rule and estimate the equilibrium real rate as
thevaluethatwouldminimizethesquareddeviationsofthe
actual funds rate from the rule recommendations. This
approachwouldyieldestimatesthatwoulddifferaccording
to sample period, inflation measure, inflation target, and
output gap measure.
25 All of the GDP-price-inflation estimates of the equilib-
riumrealrateexceedthe2.0percentsettingchosenbyTay-
lor. However, GDP and GDP price indexes have been
revised considerably since Taylor wrote his article. Such
revisions may have contributed to the difference between
Taylors setting and the estimates shown in Table 1.
26 The ranges of rule recommendations shown in Charts 3
and 5 might narrow if rule recommendations use estimates
of the equilibrium real rate based on the same measure of
inflation as used in the rule rather than using the setting of
2.0 percent for all inflation measures.
27 This difference obtains because the highest GDP-
price-inflation estimate of the equilibrium real rate, at 3.44
percent, is roughly one percentage point higher than the
lowestGDP-price-inflationbasedestimateof2.40percent.
28 This difference obtains because the highest GDP-
price-inflation estimate of the equilibrium real rate, 3.44
percent, is roughly 1½ percentage points higher than the
Taylor setting of 2.00 percent.
29Amoreaggressiveresponseofpolicytotheoutputgapis
recommended by, for example, Ball (1997). More aggres-
sive responses of policy to the inflation gap are considered
by,forexample,BatiniandHaldane(1999)andHenderson
and McKibbin (1993).
30 Because different weights should be expected to pre-
scribe different interest rate settings, the analysis in this
section might be better described as an analysis of the sen-
sitivity of rule recommendations to different weights.
31AsinTaylor(1993),therealrateandinflationtargetsare
set to 2.0 percent.
32 Also reported are the minimum and maximum ranges.
33 This is the average of the averages reported in Table 2.
34ListsoffederalfundsratetargetsaregiveninRudebusch
(1995) and Bonser-Neal, Roley, and Sellon (1997).
ECONOMIC REVIEW l SECOND QUARTER 1999 2935 Also, for reference, Chairman Greenspan referred to the
cumulative 2.5-percentage-point increase in the fed funds
target in 1994 as a very substantial tightening of monetary
conditions (May 8, 1997).
36 Difficulties associated with the choice of inflation mea-
sure, estimates of the output gap, and estimates of the equi-
librium real rate complicate policy decisions outside the
framework provided by Taylor-type rules as well.
37 This approach to evaluating reliability is based on com-
ments by Taylor (1993): If the policy rule comes so close to
describing actual Federal Reserve behavior in recent years
and if FOMC members believe that such performance was
good and should be replicated in the future even under a dif-
ferent set of circumstances, then a policy rule could provide
someguidetofuturedecisions.Anotherapproachwouldbe
toanalyzethestabilizingpropertiesoftherulesinamodelof
the U.S. economy. The stabilizing properties of a collection
of Taylor-type rules have been documented for a large col-
lection of macroeconomic models of the U.S. economy
(Levin, Wieland, and Williams 1998; Taylor 1999). But
models are not reality. And typically, the relative perfor-
mance of different rules changes across macroeconomic
models.
38 Of course, even if an estimated rule fits historical funds
rate settings well, it might not provide good policy recom-
mendations going forward.
39 This article interprets a preference for flexibility as a will-
ingness by policymakers to respond to information not
encompassed by the output gap, the inflation rate, or the
lagged federal funds rate when setting the federal funds rate.
Other interpretations may exist.
40 In this expression, the coefficient in front of inflation is
equal to (1+a). To see why, note that the general Tay-
lor-typerule,fundsrate(t)=inflation(t-1)+equilibriumreal
rate+a´(inflation(t-1)target)+b ´ outputgap(t-1),can
be rewritten as funds rate(t) = equilibrium real rate  a´
target + inflation(t-1) + a´ inflation(t-1) + b´output
gap(t-1), or funds rate(t) = constant + (1 + a) ´ infla-
tion(t-1) +b´ (output gap(t-1)), in which constant = equi-
librium real rate  a´ target.
41 It is impossible to identify estimates of both the equilib-
rium real rate and the inflation target from this specification.
The constant equals the equilibrium real rate less the product
of a multiplied by the inflation target.
42 For reference, the mean absolute deviation of the actual
funds rate from the Taylor rule recommendation as shown in
Chart 3 is 1.26 percentage points.
43 This result is somewhat sensitive to the estimation sam-
ple. For the 1987-97 sample and considering only those
specifications where the estimated weight on inflation is
positive, fit is better with expected inflation when the DRI
output gap was used, but fit was comparable to that
obtained using core CPI when the CBO output gap was
used.
44 McNees (1986) found evidence confirming that prior to
1987, policy was forward-looking with respect to inflation.
Orphanides (1997) also found evidence suggesting that
over 1987-92, simple forward-looking specifications
described policy better than some alternative Taylor-type
specifications.
45 Because estimated weights are sensitive to the estima-
tion period, so are rule recommendations. Consider, for
instance, a comparison of rule recommendations for speci-
fications that use the CBO output gap and expected infla-
tion. Recommendations from rules estimated over the two
estimation periods differ by between 1 and 4 percentage
points in 1983-84 and by roughly a percentage point in
1990-91 and in 1997, although they are generally closer
over most of the remaining years examined.
46 Orphanides (1997), Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1998b),
and Sack (1998) model smoothing in a similar fashion.
Judd and Rudebusch (1998) suggest a slightly different
specification.
47ThespecificationoftheTaylor-typerulewithsmoothing
can be interpreted as suggesting that the funds rate be
changed from the previous funds rate by a fraction 1-r of
the difference between the unsmoothed target and the pre-
vious funds rate. For values ofrbetween zero and one, this
interpretation implies that the funds rate will be partially
adjusted in the direction recommended by the unsmoothed
target.
48Resultsforothermeasuresofinflationwerenotincluded
for several reasons. First, interpretation of Taylor-type
rules with smoothing is less obvious for values ofrgreater
than one, and estimates ofrwere greater than one for core
CPIinflation.Second,forvaluesofrlessthanonebutclose
to one, policy recommendations are dominated by the pre-
vious funds rate setting and it is difficult to estimate the
weights in the inflation and output gaps with any precision.
In fact, estimates ofr were between 0.96 and 0.99 for CPI
inflation and GDP price inflation, and, in these cases, stan-
dard errors on the estimates of the weights were huge (the
smallest roughly 2, and the largest over 100). Finally, simi-
lar difficulties were obtained with other samples.
49SimulationsofafundsrateshockinBraytonandTinsley
(1996) can be interpreted as suggesting that if the nominal
funds rate is held roughly 0.6 percentage point higher for a
year then, by the end of that year, the level of real GDP will
30 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYbe roughly 0.5 percentage point lower. For rules without
smoothing, persistent deviations of rule recommendations
tend to be considerably larger than 0.6 percentage points and
last at least twice as long.
50Anexamplemayhelpclarifywhyarulethatappearstofit
well may not capture the process by which policy decisions
are made, and may not be reliable in the future. Consider the
policy rule in (5) withrset to one. The mean absolute devia-
tion of the recommendations of this rule from historical pol-
icy is 0.4 percentage pointonly a slightly worse fit than
obtained using the estimated rules with smoothing. How-
ever, the rule would not be very useful to policymakers as it
never recommends changing the federal funds rate from its
current setting. The apparent good fit of the rule obtains
becausefundsratemovementshavetendedtobegradual.As
this rule allocates all past decisions to change the funds rate
into an unexplained residual, the rule is not very reliable.
51 In a statement on July 17, 1985, then-Chairman Volcker
noted that the potential effects of interest rates and deci-
sions with respect to monetary policy on exchange rates and
the external sector of the economy have necessarily been a
significantingredientinFOMCdeliberations.Furthermore,
he commented that [FOMC] decisions with respect to pro-
viding reserves and reducing the discount rate have been
influenced to some extent by a desire to curb excessive and
ultimately unsustainable strength in the foreign exchange
value of the dollar.
52 On June 22, 1994, Chairman Greenspan testified that: In
the spring of 1989, we began to ease monetary conditions as
weobservedtheconsequenceofbalance-sheetstrainsresult-
ing from increased debt, along with significant weakness in
the collateral underlying that debt. Households and busi-
nesses became much more reluctant to borrow and spend,
and lenders to extend credita phenomenon often referred
to as the credit crunch. In an endeavor to defuse these
financialstrains,wemovedshort-termrateslowerinalong
series of steps that ended in the late summer of 1992, and
we held them at unusually low levels through the end of
1993both absolutely and, importantly, relative to infla-
tion.
53 Because the evolution of the economy depends on past
and expected future monetary policy decisions, most fore-
casting models require analysts to specify a policy rule.
Many of the real world difficulties with Taylor-type rules
disappear within a modeling framework. Because models
are a simplification of reality, many models incorporate
only a single measure of inflation. Furthermore, variables
suchaspotentialoutputandtheequilibriumrealrate,which
areunobservableintherealworld,areusuallywell-defined
in models. Also, special circumstances that may have led
policymakerstodivergefromrule-typebehaviorinthepast
are usually outside the scope of model specification. Thus,
many aspects of rule specification are less complicated
when rules are to be used in models.
Although rule specification is simplified, interpretation of
model forecasts or of model simulations based on those
rules should be made cautiously. If rule specification devi-
ates too much from the historical policy decision-making
process, then economic responses to policy built into the
modelmaybemisspecifiediftheseresponsesareestimated
using responses to the historical policy process (Lucas
1976). Model forecasts are also likely to be inaccurate if,
over the forecast horizon, policy is expected to diverge
from rule recommendations, perhaps due to discretionary
responses to special circumstances.
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